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Abstract 
Aging and changes in family arrangements and female employment have brought about important 
policy developments in long-term care. Southern European countries have relied for long on family 
care and residual social care for the dependent elderly. Two paradigmatic cases, Italy and Spain, have 
shown two apparently different trends during the last 15 years: while in Italy reforms seem to have 
been persistently blocked, in Spain, an ambitious reform has fallen short of expectations. 
Based on data on services and institutional arrangements, the article shows that a complex and 
inconsistent allocation of responsibilities across government levels, a sort of “vicious layering” of multi-
level governance, may be playing a key role in this situation. The article discusses the dysfunctional 
effects of such arrangements, namely territorial inequalities, cost-shifting between government levels 
and towards users and misallocation of resources. 
We suggest that the development and reform of LTC in Southern European countries must address 
these problems if they want to avoid getting marooned by a complex network of vetoes and resource 
allocation problems. 
Keywords 
Long-term care, multi-level governance, vicious layering, Spain, Italy 
                                                            
1 Politecnico di Milano, marlotti@polimi.it 
 
2 Escola de Treball Social, Universitat de Barcelona, manuel.aguilar.hendrickson@ub.edu 
 
 
  
2 
 
1.  Introduction  
Over the last decades the ageing of population, and specially the growing number of people over 80, 
has brought about a greater need of long-term care (LTC). This increase, together with changes in the 
labour market and in family arrangements, has shown the limits of traditional care arrangements and 
has put LTC high on the social policy reform agenda.  
These trends are strong in Mediterranean countries such as Italy and Spain, which are paradigmatic 
examples of the Southern European welfare model (Ferrera 1996; Ranci & Pavolini 2013). In these 
countries, LTC is mainly provided by intrafamily intergenerational solidarity. The public sector plays a 
residual role, often limited to people with low income and no family support, usually by means of cash 
benefits and fragmented local services. Only recently the market (formal for institutional care, often 
grey for home care) has begun to play a significant role. In both countries, families have made 
increasing recourse to the private care provided by migrant workers (Martínez-Buján 2009; Da Roit & 
Sabatinelli 2012). This pattern may be called “unsupported familism” (Saraceno & Keck 2010) or 
“passive subsidiarity” (Kazepov 2010).  
Socio-demographic data on table 1 shows how the population over 80 has almost trebled in both 
countries since the mid-eighties, and its share of the population has more than doubled, growing faster 
than the EA18 average. During the same period, female employment rates, although still lower than 
the EA18 average, have grown very quickly, including for women aged 55 to 64, which is specially 
affected by the care needs of their parents.  
 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Despite similar growing needs, over the last decade the institutional development of LTC in these 
two countries has followed different paths. In Italy, no structural reform of LTC policy has been 
undertaken (Costa 2013; Fargion 2013), whereas Spain introduced in 2006 a universal entitlement in 
the field of LTC for persons with reduced autonomy by passing the LAPAD3 (Rodríguez Cabrero & 
Marbán Gallego 2013; León & Pavolini 2014). However, the implementation of this new scheme has 
been limited. The assessment of people in need has been slow, and while cash benefits (as opposed to 
in-kind services) were only foreseen for exceptional cases, in fact they have become widespread (Da 
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Roit et al 2013; León & Pavolini 2014).  
In addition to the impact of the economic crisis and budgetary constraints, we suggest that the 
criticalities emerging in Italy and Spain regarding the development of LTC policy are also related to 
multilevel government arrangements in the fields of health and social care, and specifically to what we 
may term the “vicious” layering (Aguilar-Hendrickson, & Sabatinelli 2014) of responsibilities in this 
policy field. The lack of clear coordination and efficient allocation of responsibilities and resources has 
stimulated blame avoidance and cost shifting strategies (Costa-Font 2010; Bonoli & Champion 2014). 
Section 2 of this article discusses multilevel governance and intergovernmental relations in the field 
of LTC from a theoretical point of view. Section 3 provides an overview of the main features of the 
governance of LTC in Italy and Spain. Finally, section 4 presents some of their main dysfunctional 
effects. The concluding section summarizes the main findings. 
2.  Welfare States, multilevel governance and long-term care  
Throughout the history of modern welfare policies, the territorial dimension of its development has 
been relevant. Indeed, the development of welfare states was largely a process of centralization, moving 
from the basically local activities of poor relief and care of preindustrial societies to a growing role of 
regional and national programs (de Swaan 1988).  
In recent years, however, welfare states have transformed their territorial organization. Social 
policies have been rescaled both upwards, with a new role of supra-national institutions, and 
downwards with an increasing role of regions and municipalities (Ferrera 2005; Kazepov 2010). This 
process, together with a multiplication of public and private stakeholders, has brought about a complex 
scenario of multilevel governance in the design, management and implementation of social policies 
(Kazepov 2010).  
Evidence shows that the effects of decentralization and of multi-level governance can be ambivalent 
(Obinger et al 2005; Bonoli & Champion 2014). On the one hand, the literature on welfare federalism 
has stressed negative consequences in terms of potential veto points, specially at the sub-national level. 
A federal welfare structure and a strong division of institutional responsibilities may discourage 
necessary reforms through cost-shifting between jurisdictions (Bonoli & Champion 2014). Blame 
avoiding strategies may ease the implementation of retrenchment policies by dispersing the blame and 
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shifting the responsibility for unpopular retrenchment policies to other levels of government (Ferrera 
2005). Furthermore, the transfer of powers to sub-national level of government may also increase 
differences across territories, which can undermine a minimum standard of social citizenship in a 
national context (Kazepov 2010). However, these potential negative outcomes should not be taken for 
granted.  
Decentralization and welfare federalism may, on the other hand, ease the development and 
endurance of social programs. Local and regional authorities tend to be closer to the population and 
may be more receptive to social demands, and they may also  act as veto points to retrenchment 
proposals (Obinger et al 2005; Rauch 2006) and as reform catalysts in areas where both the perception 
of need and support for reform is widespread (Costa-Font 2010). 
The way decentralized systems of governance are “layered” may be also crucial. Multilevel systems 
characterized by forms of “virtuous layering”, in which a clear attribution of responsibilities and 
resources among the different territorial levels of government take place, can allow for both 
coordination and local adequacy, and minimize negative impacts. Conversely, negative impacts are 
more likely in countries characterized by a sort of “vicious layering”, i.e., characterized by chaotic and 
not clearly framed inter-institutional relations (Aguilar-Hendrickson, & Sabatinelli 2014).  
 
 
Moving into the field of LTC, in many countries, as in Italy and Spain, it is divided between two 
policy fields, health and social care. Health care is usually more developed with stronger entitlements, 
whereas social care is often a residual and underfunded system of social protection, with weaker 
entitlements. Conflict between health and social care authorities is common in the provision and 
funding of LTC (Alber 1995; Lewis 2001; Ranci, & Pavolini 2013) and integration of health and 
social care services has become a major issue in the field.  
This cleavage is often compounded by the division of responsibilities between levels of government. 
Several studies have pointed out the relevance of multilevel governance and intergovernmental relations 
to understand changes in LTC policy. Campbell and Morgan (2005) have compared the evolution of 
old age care in Germany and the US. The introduction in Germany in 1994 of a new LTC social 
insurance program was stimulated by the concerns of German regions (Länder) about the growing 
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burden of elderly care on sub-national social assistance schemes. German regions have an effective veto 
power on federal decision-making through the Bundesrat which helped them put pressure on the 
federal government to reform the system. Conversely, Campbell and Morgan explain the absence of a 
federal reform of LTC in the US by the fact that states have no ways to force the federal government to 
address their problems. 
According to Morel (2006), the introduction in France in 1997 of a national social assistance 
benefit for LTC was pressed, like in Germany, by the sub-national levels of government (Départements) 
concerned about the growing number of elderly people which claimed a social aid benefit for disabled 
people managed and funded locally.  
Rauch (2008) stresses the importance of intergovernmental relations when comparing changes in 
elderly care policies in Sweden and Denmark, countries with very decentralized systems. The 
autonomy of Swedish municipalities within a weak central regulation has allowed local retrenchment 
measures that explain the decrease in service coverage, in a context of budget crisis and a worsened 
demographic situation. In Denmark, a tighter central regulation of local autonomy has prevented this 
kind of process. 
Institutional fragmentation is an important feature of LTC in Mediterranean countries (Costa-Font 
2010). However, the effects of such fragmentation appear to work in different ways. In Spain, the 
introduction of a national reform for dependent elderly people in 2006 was supported by a coincidence 
of political interests at the central level (Marbán Gallego 2009). Although open vetoing is quite 
difficult in a sensitive field such as LTC, there is evidence of silent vetoing by some regional and local 
authorities. In Italy, instead, the fragmentation of interests has hindered any attempt to introduce a 
national reform in this policy field. The reform of the main LTC scheme, the Indennità di 
Accompagnamento (attendance allowance) has been hindered by the opposition of social stakeholders 
and the lack of regional pressure for reform, since their main concern is to preserve national funding 
via the health care budget. Gabriele and Tediosi (2014) point out that institutional fragmentation, 
increased by the 2001 constitutional reform, has hindered welfare innovations and reforms in Italy. 
3.  Multilevel governance of LTC in Italy and Spain   
Italy and Spain are complex states with three main levels of government. Italy has 20 regions and 
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Spain 17 “autonomous communities” with a significant degree of autonomy, plus a complex system of 
local authorities, which include municipalities and provinces, plus some other intermediate structures.4 
This complex territorial organization affects LTC because responsibilities are divided across 
government levels and in different ways for each of its components.  
Both countries have a clear differentiation between a mostly contributory and centralized pension 
and income maintenance system (which is the largest and most developed part of their social 
protection systems), a universal health care system and a residual and less developed set of means- and 
need-tested social services. Their old fragmented health insurance systems were reformed in the 1970s 
and 1980s into national universalistic care systems, centrally regulated but managed by regions. Much 
more limited reforms in social care have also taken place in both countries since the 1970s. The shift 
from residual “poor-relief” social assistance into a universalistic social care system is far from complete.  
The role of the three main levels in the field of LTC may be summarized as shown in table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
In Italy, national and regional authorities share the regulation of health care services. The national 
government defined in 2001–20025 the basic levels of care for health care (livelli essenziali di assistenza, 
LEA), that include health care services for dependent elderly people.  
The definition of the essential level for LTC is quite vague: no specific standards are set, such as 
coverage rate or user-to-practitioner ratios. It defines the share of costs covered by health services and 
the social care sector (including users’ co-payment) run by municipalities. Health authorities must 
cover the costs of residential care for dependent people with high health needs (prestazioni sociosanitarie 
ad elevata integrazione sanitaria), while for people with less intense needs, municipalities and service 
users must bear half of the total cost. No earmarked financing for LTC has been defined within the 
yearly resources of the national health fund allocated by the central state to regions. Thus, the 
development of these services has been quite limited. 
In social care, the main program in Italy is a cash benefit, the indennità di accompagnamento 
(attendance allowance). Although nationally regulated and funded, access to the benefit is managed by 
medical commissions belonging to regional health authorities. This scheme is not coordinated with 
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either health or social care services. It is granted to all persons with total disability and unable to 
perform the basic activities of daily life without help. It is non means-tested, not taxable, beneficiaries 
may use it freely. It amounts to 512 € per month (2016), regardless of the degree of need.  Introduced 
in the 1980s for disabled adults, it has gradually developed into a benefit for dependent elderly people. 
Some 2.2 million people were receiving the allowance in 2015. 
Municipalities are responsible for the provision of social care services. Regulation is in the hands of 
regions, although the national government has set the basic level of services (livelli essenziali di 
assistenza sociale, LIVEAS). Such levels were defined in 2000, but somewhat vaguely and with no 
guaranteed funding. 
 
In Spain regions are responsible for health care under a basic national framework. Management is 
fully in the hands of regions, which must fund it with their own budgets, although the national 
government contributes to that funding through the general regional funding system.  
Nationally-defined health care includes the atención sociosanitaria as one of the basic services citizens 
are entitled to. Defined as the “simultaneous and synergic” action of health and social services, the 
health care system is only responsible for long-term health care, health care during convalescence and 
functional deficit rehabilitation. Although inclusion in the common health services portfolio should 
mean a strong entitlement, in practice its definition allows for a great freedom of interpretation. 
Regions are free to determine the provision level, and to establish the mechanisms to integrate the 
action of health and social services. The limit between long-term health and social care is also very 
blurry, and moving patients between them means changing from basically free health care to the much 
more limited and not completely free field of social care. 
Pension supplements and attendance allowances are very limited, and belong in most cases to the 
pension system, which is the sole responsibility of the national government. Only one of these benefits, 
which is being phased out, is still managed by the regions but is regulated by central law. While the 
lack of a widespread cash benefit in Spain has been one of the factors that has eased in Spain (unlike in 
Italy) policy reform towards service expansion, the difficulties in the implementation of the LAPAD 
have somewhat paradoxically led to the development of a cash allowance to pay care by relatives. 
Conceived as an exceptional device for cases where no services were available, both the scarcity of 
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services plus the level of co-payments have pushed a significant part (between one third and a half) of 
the recipients towards the cash allowance. The effects of this situation on the future development of 
services is yet to be seen. 
Social services are the most fragmented component of LTC in Spain. The role of the national 
government in this field is, since the 2006 reform, similar to its role in health care: basic framework 
regulation and partial funding. Its funding role is slightly stronger than in health care, for there is a 
minimum (partial) national contribution for each protected person.  
Unlike health care, however, regulation and management of social services, as well as their funding, 
is split between regional and local authorities (Rodríguez Cabrero et al 2011). In fact, these are more 
than two levels of government. Municipalities, “districts” which are unions of municipalities, either 
voluntary (mancomunidades) or compulsory in some regions (comarcas) and provinces are all local 
authorities, meaning that this layer is, in fact, made up of three layers. All three, plus regions, are 
legally expected to provide social services. Although in theory the higher levels should be a means to 
replace municipalities when they are too small, in fact they may be simultaneously providing the same 
or alternative services at the same place (Aguilar-Hendrickson 2013). 
Responsibilities are not very clearly assigned among these levels. Regulation tends to attribute 
powers to act in the field rather than clear responsibilities. There are places where home help services 
may be provided both by local and regional governments, with each local authority establishing 
different access criteria and prices. In fact, home help services (as well as other residential and day care 
services) may be considered both as part of the LTC “system” or of “social services”, depending on 
whether service users are entitled to care according to the national law or not. This adds to the 
confusion about available services and their funding. 
4.  The dysfunctions of vicious layering  
We will now explore some of the problems that arise from governance dysfunctions in this policy 
field. Decentralization and multi-level governance of the LTC system into regional and local units need 
not be dysfunctional. It may help policies to be more adequate and closer to differing local preferences. 
But a decentralized system may result in fragmentation of responsibilities and territorial inequalities 
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(Kazepov 2010) if it is not well designed. The division into different policy subfields, itself the result of 
the need for specialization, may develop into overlapping services or gaps between them, as well as into 
cost and blame-shifting (Bonoli, & Champion 2014) if its components are not properly aligned. The 
lack of clearly defined entitlements may encourage shifting costs towards service users and their 
families, and the lack of a clear definition of responsibilities and duties may compound cost shifting 
with blame avoidance. Most of these factors may cause serious misallocation of resources. 
The institutional arrangements of long term care governance in Spain and Italy fit into what we 
have termed as “vicious layering”, that is, a multilevel governance arrangement whose design 
encourages the dysfunctions (gaps and overlaps, inefficiencies, blame and cost shifting and territorial 
inequalities) while it limits the benefits of decentralization. More specifically, the key elements of such 
an arrangement are: a) an imprecise definition of responsibilities (often defined as the power to do 
things rather than as specific duties); b) a separation between who faces certain social demands and is 
expected to “do something” about them and who collects and manages the resources needed for such a 
response; c) the lack of alignment between governance arrangements in the two policy fields involved 
(health and social care) in terms of who is in charge, who regulates them and how do people access 
services (entitlement or discretion, universal or means-tested, free or with co-payments). 
4.1. Territorial inequalities 
One of the most expected effects of decentralization is the territorial differentiation of services 
provision. By itself it shouldn’t be a problem. In fact, the main reason for decentralization is the 
existence of local differences in needs, preferences, resources and opportunities that make different 
service provision a good idea. But such differences may evolve into inequalities. 
Both Italy and Spain show very significant territorial differences in elderly care services.  Tables 3 
and 4 show regional differences in home and residential care coverage for each country. In Spain, home 
care coverage ranges from 1.9 to 9.5 per cent of people over 65 (with a national rate of 4.6). The same 
rate for residential services ranges between 2.2 and 7.5 per cent (excluding the very small city of 
Ceuta), with a national rate of 4.6. In Italy, the rate for social home care services is 1.3 per cent for the 
whole country, and it ranges between 5.3 per cent and values 0.3 per cent. Residential bed rates range 
between 4.4 and 0.6 per cent and the national average is 2.2 per cent.6 Moreover, data for Spain show 
that the actual contents of home care services may be very different. Regional differences in intensity 
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range between 10 and 32 hours per month, and the share of personal care (without home cleaning) 
ranges between 90 and 15 per cent of the total service time. Local differences inside regions may be 
even bigger.  
Table 3  
 
Table 4 
 
Regional differences may have several explanations. In Italy, there seems to be a clear relation 
between coverage rate and the North-South gradient, with some small outliers. Spain, on the contrary 
shows a much more complex pattern. Pino and Pavolini (2015; 263-266) show that regional 
differences in welfare provision are more intense in Italy than in Spain, and that they seem to be more 
correlated to economic development in the former. In Spain, while some of the wealthier regions have 
high coverage rates (the Basque Country, Navarre or La Rioja), some don’t (the Balearic Islands), and 
some of the poorer regions have higher coverage rates than some of the richer ones. In Spain there is no 
clear relationship between service coverage and female employment rates either. 
Regional political preferences and priorities play a part. But although data is incomplete and more 
analysis is needed, it seems plausible that regional and local policy options that are not clearly 
connected to needs explain a significant part in regional differences in Spain (Martínez-Buján 2014). 
Some regions (Madrid, for instance) saw the implementation of the new LTC system as troublesome 
and conflicting with their previous arrangements, leading to significant delays in the development of 
the system (Barbieri & Gallego 2016).  The regional funding system, which is generally seen as 
problematic when not as openly dysfunctional (León Alfonso 2015), also plays a part in limiting the 
development of the system in some regions.  
In both countries, available evidence suggests that the combination of loose national regulations 
with little or no national funding, and complicated regional and local arrangements for the definition 
of services and their funding are unable to guarantee comparable levels of LTC provision across 
regions. Moreover, such arrangements make shifting the blame for service inadequacy to other 
government levels very easy. 
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4.2. Cost shifting among governments 
The complex multilevel governance of the various LTC components has opened the way to develop 
cost shifting strategies between government levels and departments. Figure 1 tries to summarize the 
three main cost shifting strategies that per our hypothesis are crucial, within the multi-level governance 
of the LTC in Italy. These strategies are shifting costs from health care (regional) to the (national) 
attendance allowance, from health care (regional) to social care (local), and shifting costs to users. The 
first two , which shift costs to other levels or sectors of government, are discussed in section 4.2, the 
third, which shifts costs to families, is discussed in section 4.3. 
Figure 1 
In Italy, regions have handled the tension between increasing care demand and costs and budgetary 
constraints by “easing” access to the attendance allowance. The separation between who pays and who 
gives access and the lack of clear assessment criteria (Gori 2012), have created a perverse incentive to 
increase the number of beneficiaries, stimulated sometimes by clientelistic practices (Ascoli, & Pavolini 
2012). Therefore, regions have used the expansion of attendance allowance beneficiaries as a strategic 
lever to mitigate the financial pressure on health care put by growing LTC needs, shifting the cost to 
the central government.  
A second mechanism of cost shifting adopted by the regions over the years is the shift of health costs 
to the social sector. The essential levels of health care state that regions (through the local health 
authorities) have a responsibility to implement and partly cover the cost of LTC services for dependent 
elderly people. However, the vagueness in the definition of these standards has allowed regions and 
local health authorities a wide margin of discretion. 
In-depth regional case studies and recent court rulings show this process of shifting costs from 
health care to social care. For instance, in the region of Lombardy, the health care system is covering 
between 40 and 44 per cent of the costs in residential care, well below its legal obligation of covering 
50 per cent (Guerrini 2011; Tidoli 2013). In another region, the Marche, the regional government set 
the essential levels for residential long-term care in the early 2000s at a total daily cost of 66 euros, and 
a 50-50 split between the health and the social care sectors (co-payment included). However, only 
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approximately one third (in 2012) of those in need of LTC have received it (Ragaini 2013). 
Several court rulings illustrate this process (Gioncada et al 2011). Among others, the regional 
administrative court (TAR) of Milan ruled in 20107 that health care services were shifting their 
responsibility towards social care in cases of high care needs that should be entirely covered by the 
health care sector (prestazioni sociosanitarie ad elevata integrazione sanitaria). The court ruled the case of 
an elderly patient with a degenerative disease in coma whose needs were primarily healthcare needs 
(assisted feeding, catheter, treatment and prevention of decubitus). She had been for years in a 
residential care facility, and her relatives had covered entirely the costs, whereas, according to the law, 
the responsibility was of the health care sector. Similarly, in 2012 the Supreme Court ruled (no. 4558) 
that elderly people severely affected by Alzheimer’s disease have predominantly healthcare needs. In 
this case, therefore, the health care sector must cover entirely the costs of residential care, given the 
high intensity of need. In this case as well, the relatives had for many years borne the costs of the 
elderly person’s care in a local residential institution, whereas the responsibility was entirely of the 
health care sector.  
 
In Spain, there is no exact equivalent of the attendance allowance responsibility split we find in 
Italy. However, as we have described before, there has been a similar shift towards in-cash family care 
benefits that are cheaper and easier to manage. Spain has similar problems of assigning responsibilities 
between health and social care. Nevertheless, the fact that the main funders of both fields are the 
regions seems to have limited strategies like the ones just mentioned for Italy. The main cost shifting 
problems seem to arise between the central government and regions in the field of social care. The 
development of the LAPAD foresaw a complex mechanism by which the central government would 
contribute with a minimum amount of money for every person assessed as dependent varying of the 
degree of need. This amount was to be made up of a fixed national minimum plus a second amount 
agreed with the regions, depending on their contribution. This system was later simplified, but 
tensions between central and regional governments about how to measure their respective 
contributions has led to numerous conflicts as official evaluation reports have shown (Cervera Macià et 
al 2009; Tribunal de Cuentas 2014). Harsh cost containment measures at the central level since 2012 
have reduced the share of the cost borne by the central government and increased that of the regions 
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(Montserrat Codorniu 2014). 
In both countries, the development of these cost-shifting strategies is clearly connected to the lack of 
adequate and consistent definitions of responsibilities and duties, and to the split between who faces 
the problems and who has the resources to respond to them. 
4.3. Cost shifting towards service users 
In a context of cost containment and pressure to expand services, local (in Italy and Spain) and 
regional (in Spain) authorities responsible for social care have adopted an additional mechanism of 
cost-shifting, by increasing users’ (or relatives’) co-payment for services. Shifting costs to users is by no 
means limited to Mediterranean countries, and many countries have adopted this same strategy to cope 
with growing LTC needs in times of budgetary constraints (Ranci and Pavolini 2013). However, in 
Italy and Spain, the fragmented institutional framework regarding users’ co-payment has stimulated 
this mechanism as well. The most affected field has been residential care, which in Italy is very relevant 
for local budgets (Fargion 2013).  
In Italy, the national essential levels for residential care don’t specify how the costs attributed to the 
social care sector must be divided between municipalities and dependent elderly people. The only clear 
element is the indicator for means-testing, the ISEE,8 which is family based. For people with 
disabilities and the dependent elderly the law has foreseen, instead, an individual means-test. After the 
devolution of responsibilities on social policies to regions in 2001 and the incomplete implementation 
of the law regarding the ISEE, municipalities have not adopted the ISEE for defining social costs for 
residential care. They have continued to consider not the “individual” economic condition, but that of 
the family as whole, requiring payment from relatives well beyond the nuclear family, i.e., not 
cohabitating adult children who according to the Italian Civil Code have a duty to provide support in 
case of need (Naldini 2003). Consequently, co-payment for residential care services has increased 
significantly, making it almost impossible for many families. 
In Spain, the diversity of cost sharing arrangements in social care is even larger. Social services are 
split between regional and local authorities that may mean up to four different levels of government, 
depending of the area concerned. Each region has its own social services act, and responsibilities are not 
always clearly defined for each level of government. Although residential services tend to be regional, in 
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many cases municipalities or provinces run them, and the opposite may be said for home care services. 
Each of these hundreds of local and regional authorities may fix pricing and assessment and admission 
criteria.  
The LAPAD was expected to introduce some order and clarity into this situation. It set relatively 
clear assessment procedures to determine who is dependent and who is not. On the other hand, it did 
not set clear criteria for co-payments, which must be regulated by regions, except for a generic clause 
that states that nobody should be deprived of care because of his or her economic situation. Until 2012 
each region had its own system of setting co-payments. In 2012, under a strong pressure to reduce 
costs, all regions agreed to some common criteria. Although the criteria are common, in most cases 
they must be applied to a “service price” that is fixed by the concerned local authority. Such prices are 
not necessarily related to real costs. While the percentage of the cost is common for all regions and 
municipalities, the fixing of service prices allows for significant variations. 
These criteria have put a very strong pressure on users, who are expected to cover a large share (up 
to 90 per cent of the cost) and are granted a very low level of exempt income (i.e., the amount of 
income that the person is entitled to keep), which was about 120 euros per month in 2014 (Montserrat 
Codorniu 2014).  
The shift from a “family” to “a migrant in the family” care model in Italy (Naldini, & Saraceno 
2008; Da Roit, & Sabatinelli 2012; Costa 2013) and in Spain (Martínez-Buján 2009), has acted as a 
safety valve as increasing care needs have been met with insufficient and fragmented service responses. 
Although the origins of such a model precede the reforms and the (limited) development of services, 
the important role of basically free to use cash allowances in both countries in easing such tensions has 
played into the hands of the migrant-in-the-family model. 
4.4. Misallocation of resources 
Data for Spain show some of the paradoxes and problems of a top-down universalizing reform of 
social care that must deal with the autonomy of a jungle of different government levels. The 2006 
reform was formally the setting of some minimum standards to ensure that all citizens assessed as 
“dependent” in Spain has the same basic entitlement to care. It did not arrange nor organize the care 
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system because it is in the hands of regions and local authorities. In fact, regions and local governments 
had been providing care for dependent people for years, just without any common criteria or standards 
and with no recognition of entitlements. The reform envisaged a process of “topping up” the existing 
services to cover not just a fraction of the dependent but all of them. The significant expansion of 
services in the previous years meant that the effort seemed possible. 
If we look at the latest available figures (for 2012) on services for elderly people (IMSERSO 2014), 
we find some apparently paradoxical data. Out of 952 thousand claimants who had been assessed as 
dependent and entitled to care, 231 thousand were waiting for the allocation of services and 426 
thousand were receiving the (supposedly exceptional) family care allowance. Some 295 thousand were 
being cared for by residential, day care or home care services. One might assume that such a large 
proportion of entitled dependent people not receiving services might be explained by the lack of 
enough care services, as it has been often argued. 
Figure 2 
Nevertheless, three quarters of public home care service recipients were non-dependent elderly 
people. While dependent entitled persons occupied 143,707 residential beds, another 241,753 were 
either being used by non-dependent persons or simply not occupied, 90,000 of which were either 
public of publicly funded. So, at the same time there was a lack of available services and a massive 
underuse of residential facilities and a widespread use of home help resources for less needed people. 
 
Unoccupied beds in residential care facilities are difficult to measure. Official data are patchy but 
suggest that several thousand publicly funded residential beds might be unoccupied. Estimates using 
census data (Abellán 2013) suggest that about 20 per cent of all residential beds (70 to 80 thousand) 
may be unoccupied. Although no definite pattern seems to appear, surprisingly some of the regions 
with a higher vacancy rate (up to 40 per cent) are regions with low coverage rates. 
In any case, these data strongly suggest there is a serious problem of resource misallocation. About 
home care services, local data and anecdotal evidence suggests that local authorities have for years been 
expanding home help as a low intensity service for people with light or no needs, leaving dependent 
people to be cared by families or in residential services (mostly in provincial and regional hands). Local 
political and management reasons may explain this policy orientation, paradoxical as it may seem for 
devoting scarce resources to those in less need. It’s allows for a larger (albeit thinner) spread of services 
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to more people, building a larger constituency. It is also easier to manage, since lighter care services are 
easier to organize along the whole day for different users. 
The case of residential services is slightly different. The high price of some private services may 
explain part of the vacancies, as well as the construction of residences in places where needs were 
smaller than it was thought. Private for-profit residence misallocation may just be a bad business 
decision for which the investor should pay, although in some cases such decisions were encouraged by 
(equally unwise) incentives by local authorities, such as tax exemptions or free access to land.  
Piecemeal information also shows that the public sector also built residential services with little 
demand. In some known cases, residential homes were built because of political pressure from small 
town local councils asking for regional funding to build local nursing homes, well above the expected 
demand (the minimum “reasonable” size for the homes was larger than the local demand). Some 
regions funded the construction of these services that were then left in the hands of local governments, 
with significant deficits. Once again, unclear definition of responsibilities, governments that are 
expected to do things that other governments must pay for in the end, and ad hoc bilateral agreements 
that are prone to clientelistic arrangements are a significant factor in the misallocation of resources. 
Moreover, some of the cost containment measures such as high co-payments are dissuading people 
from using the services they need —and thus are kept unused. Further research is needed to fully 
measure and understand this problem.  
 
As in Spain, in Italy the lack of a clear definition of institutional responsibilities in the field of LTC, 
and the vague definition of the basic levels of care, are developing into the misallocation of resources. 
Table 5 
 
Although the Italian residential care system varies from region to region, it includes residenze socio-
sanitarie, integrated health and social residential facilities with a high health care component which are 
the rough equivalent of nursing homes. Data on table 5 show that in Northern Italy, where residential 
care is more developed, the share of nursing homes is significantly higher. In 2013 88.9 per cent of 
elderly people (dependent or not) in residential care were in residenze socio-sanitarie in these regions. 
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This means, on the one hand, that they receive a higher intensity of care (which is reasonable for 
dependent people), but on the other hand, it means that the centrality given to nursing homes in 
residential care has moved a significant number of non-dependent elderly people into these intensive 
care homes. More than half (55.4 per cent) of elderly people with no disabilities in residential care were 
in residenze socio-sanitarie in Northern Italy in 2013. The situation in Southern Italy is quite the 
opposite. Not only is residential care scarcer, but the supply of residenze socio-sanitarie is also more 
limited in relative terms. In 2013, 60.3 per cent of all elderly people in residential care were in nursing 
homes in the South. The fact that only 77.3 per cent of dependent elderly people in residential care are 
in nursing homes (far from the 92.7 per cent national average) suggests that about one fourth of the 
dependent elderly are in a type of residential care that is lighter than what they need. At the same time, 
almost a half of the non-dependent elderly people in residential care are in nursing homes in the South. 
All this suggests a combination of over-servicing of people with low needs (in most of the country) and 
under-servicing of people with high needs (specially in the South), in a context of overall insufficient 
supply of residential care. 
5.  Conclusions  
In this article, we have analyzed, in a comparative perspective, the recent trends in long-term care 
for dependent elderly people in Italy and Spain. These are two countries where LTC needs are mainly 
covered by family and intergenerational solidarities. In-kind social services have been residual, while 
only recently the market has begun to play a significant role in both countries: families have made 
increasing recourse to the private care provided by migrant workers. The onset of the economic crisis 
has opened a process of retrenchment in both countries with negative impacts in terms of care 
arrangements for dependent elderly people. 
The institutional development of LTC in these two countries has followed different paths. In Italy, 
no structural reform of LTC policy has been undertaken: a stagnant dynamic has affected in-kind 
services, while the coverage of the needs has been mainly delegated to an inertial expansion of the 
attendance allowance. Spain, on the other hand, expanded services and introduced in 2006 a national 
reform which established a formal universal entitlement to care services for dependent people. 
However, the complex and unclear distribution of responsibilities in the field of social care services 
and its misalignment with the entitlement and governance model of health care has allowed for a series 
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of vetoes, cost and blame shifting strategies and serious inefficiencies. The lack of a clear definition of 
responsibilities amongst the (numerous) institutional actors of LTC has a significant role in hindering 
reforms (in Italy) or in marooning them (in Spain). The reform in Spain set some basic national 
entitlements and standards but did not deal with the need for clearly allocating responsibilities and 
(enough) resources, which means “concentrating” responsibilities even in a decentralized model. It did 
acknowledge the need for health and social care coordination, but did not establish an aligned 
governance model that eased dealing with the “usual” problems of such coordination.  Any reforms 
aimed at expanding LTC in a context of aging populations in these countries should address the 
problems posed by such institutional arrangements. 
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Notes 
1.  
2  
3 The Ley de Promoción de la Autonomía Personal y Atención a las personas en situación de 
dependencia, (Personal Autonomy Promotion and Care of Dependent People Act), commonly 
known in Spanish as ley de dependencia or LAPAD. 
4 The designations of government levels may be somewhat confusing. In Spain, some regions use 
the term “national” for their institutions and the term “state” is often used to designate central 
institutions, which is the exact opposite of the naming convention in other countries. For the 
sake of simplicity, we shall use the terms “national” or “central” for country-wide institutions; 
“regional” for institutions of the Spanish “comunidades” (regardless of whether they consider 
themselves “nations”, “nationalities” or “regions”) and the Italian regions; and “local” for 
municipal and provincial institutions. 
5 Decreto 29 novembre 2001 and Legge 289/2002, art. 54. 
6 These data must be used with caution. They may not be fully homogeneous, and since most 
services are local, data is not always complete. 
7 TAR ruling 1584/2010 
8 Indicatore di situazione economica equivalente, or indicator of equivalent economic conditions. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1.  Selected socio-economic indicators, Italy and Spain compared to the Euro-18 
area 
1.1. Population over 80 
 
a) As a percentage of whole population 
 1985 2000 2014 
EA18 2,8 3,5 5,5 
Italy 2,5 3,9 6,4 
Spain 2,3 3,8 5,7 
 
 
b) Growth since 1985 
 1985 2000 2014 
EA18 100 134 222 
Spain 100 168 296 
Italy 100 160 278 
 
 
1.2. Female employment rate 
 
a) Women 25-54 
 1985 2000 2014 
EA18 NA 64,0 70,3 
Spain 27,9 51,0 62,3 
Italy 43,1 50,9 57,6 
 
 
b) Women 55-64 
 1985 2000 2014 
EA18 NA 24,2 45,6 
Spain 18,9 20,1 37,8 
Italy 14,8 15,3 36,6 
 
Source: own elaborations on Eurostat (tables demo_pjanind, demo_pjangroup,) and OECD data. 
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Table 2.  The allocation of institutional responsibilities in the field of elderly care: Italy 
and Spain 
 Care allowances* In-kind health care services In-kind social care services 
 Regulation Management Funding Regulation Management Funding Regulation Management Funding 
Italy          
State +++ +++ +++ +++ (-)  +++ + (-)  + 
Regions  ++  +++ +++ + +++  + 
Municipalities        +++ +++ 
 
Spain 
         
State +++ +++ +++ +  + +  + 
Regions  +  +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
Municipalities       ++ +++ ++ 
 
 
R = regulation; M = management; F = funding.  
Degree of responsibility:  
+++ = very high; ++ = high; + = low; (-) = weakened responsibility; blank = absent.   
* In Italy, the attendance allowance. In Spain includes only pension supplements and old attendance allowances 
which are very limited. Family care allowances as part of the LAPAD system are included in in-kind services. 
Source: own elaborations. 
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Table 3.  Ratio of social home care users and residential beds for the elderly to population 
over 65 by autonomous community in Spain (2012) 
 Social home care users Residential beds 
Andalucía 4.36 3.23 
Aragón 4.62 6.36 
Asturias 4.49 5.96 
Balears (Illes) 2.61 2.39 
Canarias 3.54 2.94 
Cantabria 3.48 4.98 
Castilla-La Mancha 4.76 7.36 
Castilla y León 5.82 7.47 
Cataluña 4.45 5.00 
C Valenciana 1.92 2.97 
Extremadura 5.53 6.11 
Galicia 2.89 3.65 
Madrid 9.50 4.94 
Murcia 2.41 2.21 
Navarra 5.51 5.65 
País Vasco 2.43* 5.96 
Rioja 5.91 5.05 
Ceuta 7.72 1.85 
Melilla 6.19 4.00 
SPAIN 4.61 4.62 
 
* Data for 2013 
Source: IMSERSO 
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Table 4.  Ratio of social home care users and residential beds for the elderly to population 
over 65 by regions in Italy (2012) 
 Social home care users Residential beds 
Piemonte 0.8  3.9 
Valle d'Aosta 5.3  3.9 
Liguria 1.1  2.9 
Lombardia 1.4  3.0 
Trentino 4.3  4.4 
Veneto 1.4  3.1 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 2.3  3.5 
Emilia-Romagna 1.4  3.3 
Toscana 0.7  1.7 
Umbria 0.3  1.3 
Marche 0.7  2.1 
Lazio 0.9  1.2 
Abruzzo 1.3  1.5 
Molise 2.0  1.8 
Campania 1.1  0.6 
Puglia 0.7  1.0 
Basilicata 1.3  1.3 
Calabria 1.0  0.8 
Sicilia 1.7  1.1 
Sardegna 2.5  1.3 
ITALY 1.3 2.2 
 
Source: Istat (b); (c). 
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Table 5.  Share of service users in residenze socio-sanitarie over the total number of 
residential care users per category. Italy 2013 
 North Center South Italy 
All elderly persons 88,9 70,4 60,3 81,7 
Non-dependent elderly persons 55,4 38,3 41,1 47,5 
Dependent elderly persons 95,7 88,4 77,3 92,7 
 
Source: own elaborations on Istat (2015). 
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Figure 1. Vicious layering, cost shifting and care privatization of LTC for dependent 
elderly people in Italy 
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Figure 2. Dependent and non-dependent elderly people cared for by social services in 
Spain 2012 
Source: IMSERSO and SISAAD 
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